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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY FOREMEN
By J. Carl Cabe
The unionization of foremen in mass-production industries has
set off a new series of problems in industrial relations. Immediate
questions arise as to its effects on our industrial economy: Is the
foreman a part of management? Does foreman unionism threaten
a breakdown of management? Can a unionized foreman effectively
carry out managerial policies? Will the unionized foreman help to
increase or decrease production? What is the relationship between
the rank-and-file labor movement and foremen's unions?
Although the present study does not attempt to answer all the
issues that have been raised, any study of the present foreman's
relationship to modern industry must surely concern itself with such
probleros.
Foreman participation in unions is not entirely new. They have
traditionally been covered by union agreements in such trades as
printing, building, metal, and railroads. Furthermore, there are
nine long-established unions whose membership consists of fore-
men or supervisors in the maritime and railroad industries and in
the postal railway mail service. But the unionization of foremen
in mass-production industries such as steel, automobile, electrical
products, rubber, and clothing was comparatively unknown until
1943. Several attempts to organize them had failed until independ-
ent groups began to obtain noticeable organizational results during
the first years of the war.
The person termed a "foreman" in industry is a supervisor
who directs and coordinates the work of production employees
placed directly under his supervision by higher management. He
does not set company policy but interprets this policy to his sub-
ordinates. Often an employee who works on the job with other
production men is placed in charge of the men and given a title such
as a "working foreman," "gangleader" or "strawboss." Such an
employee is not here considered as a foreman or supervisor.
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The Foreman's Traditional Status
Almost without exception, the foreman has been traditionally
classified as part of management. To some of the workers, he was
the only boss they knew and his absolute authority over them was
rarely questioned. He had the power to hire and fire and to transfer
his workers from one job to another. This man, known as "the
boss," enjoyed a rather wide latitude in determining the wage rates
of new employees and the wage increases of his workers.
Since the beginning of the present century, the growth of mass-
production industry has been rapid. The large outlay of capital
necessary for mass production has necessitated a change in the
internal organization of management as well as in the form of
ownership. Reorganization of operational methods has substantially
affected the status of the foreman. No longer can one man, or one
group of men, rely on general knowledge of the job as the basis of
daily production. Rather, in mass-production operations, the com-
ponent parts processed in individual departments must be so con-
trolled that a smooth flow of the finished product may develop.
Independent action of one section or department may throw the
entire plant out of gear.
As the old operating method gave way to large-scale and more
refined methods of production, a staff organization of technical
assistants and advisors was introduced to serve as a consultative
body to establish departmental controls, and to coordinate produc-
tion operations. Although such stafif organization may act only as
an advisory agency without direct authority over production em-
ployees, this innovation takes away the foreman's power to set his
own pace and maintain his control within his section of the plant
process.
In order to obtain a uniform employment system, all jobs
within a plant must be analyzed and grouped according to similarity
of skills. With this information available, a centralized department
of employment can investigate types of labor available and localities
in which to make proper contacts. The foreman previously had to
depend upon his own acquaintances or upon applicants who were
friends of his workers to fill vacant jobs in his department. With
the achievement of a centralized employment system, the foreman
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has been relieved of his hiring and job placement duties and has
lost control of transfers and discharges as well.
The rapid growth of industrial unions has also had a tremen-
dous effect on the foreman's job relationship in the plant. In man}-
cases the foreman has not been trained to work in a plant operating
under a union contract and he has resented the restrictions the con-
tract places on him. Companies that have the best records in labor
relations have carefully instructed the foremen in the terms of the
new contract and notified them immediately of any changes in
policy.
Because of the grievance procedure provided by many union
agreements, the worker need no longer bring his grievances to the
foreman and rely solely upon him for help. Some top executives
have been prompt to back the foreman whose shop-steward ignored
him as the first step in the grievance procedure. Other executives
have been indifferent, considering the problem one for the foreman
to work out.
A New Role for Foremen
The foreman's role in industry has, indeed, altered from his
previous managerial position. Centralized control over policies con-
cerning production, employment, wage rates, and union contracts
has abolished much of the authority the foreman formerly main-
tained. Although these controls are quite necessary, they have given
rise to conditions which have weakened a vital link in the business
organization— the foreman.
Often the foreman, whose job has not been so carefully defined
by scientific study as that of the worker, does not know who is his
actual superior. In present-day industry, the foreman may be con-
ferring with his direct boss in the line organization, with one to a
dozen staff specialists ranging from efficiencv engineers to per-
sonnel counselors, and with department foremen whose work is co-
ordinated with his. Again, he may be dealing with his subforemen,
strawbosses, lead men, other section leaders assisting in his de-
partment, and with the shop steward (if the plant is organized)
representing his workers.
With a large staff organization, the status of the foreman
needs to be more carefully defined than under the old line organi-
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zation. Management in general recognized the need for a more
scientific approach in determining the actual duties and responsi-
bilities of its supervisory employees. Often, however, high-sound-
ing titles and symbols of office are substituted for precise definitions
of authority and jurisdiction.
Although the foreman's authority has decreased, his responsi-
bility for executing policies has increased. He is held to higher and
higher production standards, and his relationship to the worker has
become even more vital. Higher management must depend upon
him for knowledge of the workers and of the job conditions. Not
only must the modern foreman be more versatile in the immediate
operations of his department, but his work demands that he under-
stand operating methods and procedures in related departments. He
must be well acquainted with company rules and policies. He must
know the cost system, the payment system, and the general manu-
facturing methods. In order to check on adjustments in his depart-
ment, the foreman must understand the mechanics of production
control, cost control, and time-and-motion study,' even though they
are administered outside his department.
Since the growth of widespread unionization, our national and
state governments have passed an increased number of labor laws.
As a supervisory official whose acts are considered to be in accord
with company policy, the foreman must be familiar with the labor
laws of the United States and of the state in which he is employed
as well as with a specific contract which the company may have with
the workers' union.
Foreman's Advantage Narrowed
In the past, the foreman has had a better industrial position than
that of the worker. He has enjoyed vacations, time off, sick leave,
and other so-called privileges that the worker did not receive. With
the rise of industrial unions, however, workers began to receive
some of these advantages, as well as increased pay. As these unions
developed, the foremen recognized that their previous advantages
were less important when compared with the new gains of the
workers. Furthermore, the new terms were stated in written con-
tracts and were no longer merely favors granted by management.
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Previous to the war, little attention was paid to wage differ-
entials between the foreman and his workers because it was thought
that the foreman's job security was much greater than that of the
men he supervised. Although this may have been true in many
cases, this advantage was largely eliminated during the war years.
The foreman's job-tenure was seldom greater than that of produc-
tion workers when production was high and full employment at a
peak. As production workers' wages increased, the differential be-
tween the foreman and the worker became narrower. According to
one study, many foremen were actually receiving lower wages than
the workers they supervised.^
When management did not re-establish adequate wage differ-
entials in such cases, foremen frequently tried to strengthen their
bargaining position through unionization. The War Labor Board
recognized that in general prewar wage differentials between pro-
duction workers and foremen should be maintained. For example,
in May, 1944, the Sixth Regional War Labor Board granted the
Bader Meter Company permission to increase the wage rates for
foremen to an extent that the wage differential between foremen
and production workers would be restored.
As a rule, information as to the foreman's compensation has
been reluctantly released. For instance, the foreman's w^age issue
was discussed in a panel hearing before the War Labor Board
;
yet
the report readily admitted that no comparative data on compensa-
tion was actually presented to the panel. ^ With only a small amount
of such data available, generalizations are dangerous.
However, there appears on the whole to be no evidence for
complaint concerning the basic wage rate. There is perhaps more
criticism over the inequalities among foremen with similar re-
sponsibilities than over the basic wage rate itself.
Although unions have traditionally opposed an incentive method
of payment, the wage-stabilization policy maintained during the
war led to an increase in the number of incentive payment plans.
By 1943, the majority of workers had received all the wage-rate
increases allowed by the War Labor Board under the Little Steel
Formula, which limited the increase in the basic rate to 15 per cent
over rates in effect on January 1. 1941. But, the introduction of an
incentive payment plan would often enable the worker to achieve
L
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an additional increase in his take-home pay. The extent to which
many local unions joined with employers in requesting approval
of incentive wage plans resulted largely from the wage stabiliza-
tion program. With an increase of this form of payment, a further
complication arises in a comparative analysis of foremen's compen-
sation. A wage differential is much easier to maintain when the
actual wage rates are determined on an hourly or a time basis.
When an incentive plan is introduced for production workers, the
plant's entire wage structure may need to be readjusted in order
to retain the differential. For example, a worker may increase his
operating efficiency and thus his take-home pay, to the extent that
his average weekly earnings equal or exceed those of his immediate
supervisor.
Overtime and Seniority Issues
Prior to the war, supervisors did not, as a rule, receive over-
time payment. It was considered a part of their job to have the
necessary services, reports, and plans prepared ahead of the regular
production schedule. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 pro-
vides that a worker covered by this act be paid time and one-half
his regular rate for all hours worked over forty, but the act
exempts foremen and minor supervisors who are classified as ad-
ministrative, executive, or professional employees. The foreman has
usually received his regular salary regardless of overtime. Although
this wage partiality to the production worker had been apparent for
some time, its inequity did not become critical until the war period.
As the amount and regularity of overtime increased, most com-
panies continued to work their salaried foremen overtime without
additional payment. Foremen maintained that workers frequently
received more take-home pay than the foremen because of overtime
payments. In fact, some production workers during the war refused
promotion to foremanships because a loss of as much as $100 a
month would result from this difference in wage policy."
Because many companies do not systematically review their
wage structure, wage inequities continued to increase. Few em-
ployers realized this situation before the wage-stabilization pro-
gram was in effect, and needed improvements in wage structure
could not then be made without the approval of the War Labor
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Board or the Treasury Department. For the inauguration of over-
time rates, the employer had to have special permission from the
WLB or the Treasury Department. If overtime rates were not
paid before the war to employees subject to the jurisdiction of the
Treasury, the employer had to ask for a salary increase rather
than an overtime rate.
Along with the increase of employees in industrial produc-
tion during the war period, the number of foremen doubled in some
plants. Such a large influx of minor supervisory officials increased
the desire for a recognized form of job tenure in order to clarify
the manner in which some of them would be laid off as the peak
employment in manufacturing plants declined after the war. Many
older supervisors felt that they would lose their jobs to younger
men who had been promoted to foremanships during the war. The
rather recent demands for job seniority are apparently the result
of failure to give sufficient attention to length of service when pro-
moting foremen during the war.
The organized foremen appear to recognize that a straight
seniority policy would restrict the freedom of management to give
ample credit for ability or merit. Instead, they have urged that man-
agement include seniority as a factor in promotion, transfers, and
demotions.
Foremen Turn to Organization
The foreman has experienced the effects of the revolutionary
changes that have taken place in mass-production industry over the
past few decades and the consequent changes in his role and func-
tion. Correctly or not, he has concluded in many instances that he
is no more a part of policy-making management than he is a part
of the working group he supervises. His accumulated grievances,
together with vivid examples of what organization can do to im-
prove job conditions, have turned his thoughts and activities toward
organization.
One of the first foreman's unions in mass-production industry
was The United Foremen and Supervisors organized in 1938. The
union was at first rejected when it sought affiliation with the CIO.
The union was accepted, however, in December, 1938, and later won
agreements in two plants. Soon the organization was fairly well
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established in eleven plants and had about 900 dues-paying mem-
bers. During a strike at the Chrysler plant in 1939, the union re-
quested a conference with management. In a public protest, the
company denounced the organization and asserted that unions were
trying to sit on both sides of the bargaining table. The incident
proved rather embarrassing to the CIO and the foremen's issue
was withdrawn in order to settle the rank-and-file workers' dispute.
In 1940 the charter of the union was revoked by the CIO.
Foreman's Association of America
The Foreman's Association of America was founded in Novem-
ber, 1941, by about 1200 foremen of the Ford Motor Company who
met in the Fordson High School. By November, 1942, an agreement
had been signed with the company. After the Maryland Drydock
decision in 1943, in which the National Labor Relations Board
ruled that supervisors were not a unit appropriate for collective
bargaining within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, the Ford Company refused to recognize the union for the
adjustment of foremen's grievances.* The company reversed this
stand, however, during the May, 1944, strike and signed a con-
tract with the Association.
The program of the Association is similar to that of a rank-and-
file union in that it is based on wages, hours, working conditions,
and job security through a form of job control. The Association
differs from most unions in that it makes overtures to management
for a definite form of cooperation between the two. Merit, for
example, is emphasized along with seniority as a basis for promo-
tion or discharge. The union has requested more training from
management on company policy and in industrial relations. Such
instruction, FAA officials maintain, will enable the foreman to
answer the complaints of workers and thereby settle many griev-
ances within the department. The Association, proposing to be a
partner with management, has emphasized the need for scientific
management and industrial discipline in order to obtain maximum
plant efficiency.
When the National Labor Relations Board ruled that foremen
did not constitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining, the
Association continued to marshal its forces for ultimate employer
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recognition. Throughout the year 1943, numerous small work
stoppages took place at the Ford Motor Company. Toward the end
of the year, the Association filed notice under the War Lahor
Disputes Act that strike votes were to be taken at four plants of
the Briggs Manufacturing Company and the De Soto plant of
Chrysler Company in Detroit and at the Ivepublic Steel Company
in Cleveland.
During a series of rather serious strikes in Detroit in May,
1944, the foreman's union movement gained national recognition.
Foremen in 17 plants of 6 corporations walked out. So great was
the power and aggressiveness of the foremen that the War Labor
Board had to invoke all its pressure to stop the strike. According
to the Monthly Lahor Rcvieiv of May, 1945, there were at least
thirtv strikes of foremen in 1944. These strikes involved 130,000
workers and caused 650,000 man-days of idleness. The largest
strikes involved the Foreman's Association in Michigan during
May; the United Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Employees
(District 50 of United Mine Workers of America) during August
and September in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky ; and
the Wright Aircraft Supervisory Association of the Wright Aero-
nautical Plant in New Jersey during September and November.
Despite the aggressiveness of FAA, the national labor organi-
zations have tended to remain aloof from the Association. Union
officials have felt that this new union might prove to be too much
trouble to their own organizations ; however, their attitude toward
foreman unions has been what might be described as benevolent
neutrality.
By September, 1946. the Foreman's Association of America had
308 chapters with approximately 40,000 signed members. Several
contracts had been signed. The master contract with the Ford
Motor Company covered the Detroit chapter with the Company
and with six supplements, covered six chapters in various parts of
the country. Other Ford plants under the master contract included
plants at Iron Mountain, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; Hamilton,
Ohio; Green Island, New York; and Buffalo, New York. In addi-
tion, contracts were signed by United Stove Company, Ypsilanti,
Michigan ; Baldwin Rubber Company. Pontiac, Michigan ; (General
Ceramics Company and Steatite Corporation, Keasbey, New Jersey
;
rtP ,u:u^
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Lever Brothers Company, Hammond, Indiana; Nicholson Transit
Company, Detroit, Michigan; and ConsoHdated Paper Company,
Monroe, Michigan.
Miners' Supervisory Union
The Mine Officials' Union of America was organized in De-
cember, 1940, as an independent union. The union was organized
as a result of a shift from a monthly wage to a daily wage rate
which effected a wage reduction at one of the Ford Collieries. By
1943, this organization claimed a membership of 12,000 to 15,000.
In October, 1942, the union requested admission to the United
Mine Workers of America. Consequently, the UMWA constitution
was amended so that this new group might be admitted. The super-
visors were then organized as a branch of District 50 of the
UMWA and were called the United Clerical, Technical and Super-
visory Employees of the Mining Industry.
In May, 1946, the government seized the mines as a means of
keeping them in operation when the mine operators and the
officials of the United Mine Workers failed to reach an agreement.
An agreement covering supervisory employees was later signed by
the Union and the Federal Coal Mine Administration." The coal
operators had previously refused to recognize the supervisors'
union, and the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company had maintained
that such a contract with the government would weaken its efforts
to obtain a court decision on unionization. The contract between
the Coal Mine Administration and UMWA included a clause that
the union, upon the request of the Coal Mine Administrator, would
file a charge with the National Labor Relations Board stating that
the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company had refused to bargain with
the supervisors. Such a charge would enable the company to obtain
a judicial review of the appropriateness of the foreman units for
purposes of collective bargaining.
United Foremen of America
With foreman unionization developing rapidly, the CIO
chartered the United Foremen of America during the summer of
1945. This union began to organize foremen particularly in the
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Steel mills of western Pennsylvania. This group is a loose organi-
zation of local unions in the steel industry and, as yet, has no
national organization. It is chartered directly by the CIO.
Are Foremen "Employees"?
With the inauguration of such laws as the Railway Labor Act,
Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the
National Labor Relations Act, collective bargaining in the United
States became compulsory when a majority of employees in an
appropriate employee unit made such a recjuest. Not only does this
federal legislation recognize the right of organization, but it is
designed to protect the employee in the organization of his choice.
As a result of wartime exigencies, the National War Labor Board
was established by executive order on January 12, 1942, to settle
labor disputes by peaceful means. By executive order on October
3, 1942, its authority was increased to include all industries and all
employees.
Foreman organizations, in their attempt to gain recognition
from various managements, have sought certification as units ap-
propriate for collective bargaining under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The decisions of the National Labor Relations Board
have been somewhat inconsistent on this score, thus intensifying
the controversy over the question of foreman unionization. Whether
foremen may obtain certification depends upon the interpretation
of the term "employer" and "employee" in the Act. According to
section 2 an employer "includes any person acting in the interest of
an employer, directly or indirectly"; yet in section 2 (3) the Act
maintained that an employee "shall include any employee . . . and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice. ..." Although the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947, as it amends the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, has revised this definition, it seems advisable to include
the older definition here in order to treat properly the history of
the NLRB decisions regarding foreman unions. Details of the
amendment pertaining to supervisory employees will be given at
another point.
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NLRB Decisions
A foreman's union was first certified by the National Labor
Relations Board for collective bargaining in 1942.'^ A majority of
the board maintained that the minor supervisors of the Union
Collieries Coal Company had no voice in company policy and no
actual power to hire or discharge. NLRB Member Reilly, in his
dissenting opinion, declared that there was need to limit the broad
definition of the term "employee" in the Act. The failure to do so,
he maintained, would remove these minor supervisors from the
side of management and, thereby, make a gap in the managerial
hierarchy since these supervisors present grievances of the workers
to higher management.
In the Union Collieries Coal Company decision, the NLRB was
concerned only with an independent group of supervisors, but in
the subsequent Godchaux Sugar Company case, the Board upheld a
group of supervisors who were represented by a rank-and-file union
as a unit appropriate for collective bargaining.^
Board approval of the two groups seemed to clarify the status
of minor supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act.
Supervisors of the same supervisory level were considered an
appropriate unit, and employers were forbidden to discriminate
against those who desired unionization.
On April 6, 1943, how^ever, the National Labor Relations Board
conducted a hearing on foreman unionization to serve as a guide
for a reconsideration of the entire question. The hearing was par-
ticularly important because Member William Leiserson, who had
concurred with Chairman Millis in the Union Collieries and
Godchaux cases, had resigned. The new Board member, John N.
Houston, had not yet committed himself on foreman unionization.
NLRB reversed its former policy on May 11, 1943, and held in
the Maryland Drydock Company case that supervisors with sub-
stantial managerial authority could not be considered units appro-
priate for collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act.^
Members Reilly and Houston, forming the majority, reiterated
the minority position in the LTnion Collieries case and further
maintained that, while the traditional status of foremen had
changed somewhat, union activity of supervisory employees would
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be detrimental to production efficiency and t(j the free organizational
activity of the production workers.
Chairman Millis, in turn, offered a vigorous dissent. He charged
that the majority had attempted to predict all possible consequences
of the decision. Should management suffer as a result of foremen's
unions, he believed that this problem would have to be met by labor
through its organizations, by management through its disciplinary
powers, or by the National Labor Relations Board through its
ability to determine the appropriate bargaining units and its find-
ings and orders against imfair labor practices. He maintained that
foremen, as employees, had the right to organize and that their
removal from the protection of the Act would merely force them
to use their economic power when they felt aggrieved, a method
the Act was intended to discourage.
The complete reversal not only withdrew the right of certifica-
tion for foremen who desired to bargain collectively, but also a
foreman's right to protest discriminatory practices by the employer
was eliminated. The decision affected the long-established craft
unions as well. Any unionized supervisor would now have to
function outside the jurisdiction of the Act.
Although the National War Labor Board was not concerned
with unit certification, it was established to settle all labor disputes
by peaceful means. On January 6, 1944, the Board held hearings to
determine w'hether or not its jurisdiction included the disputes of
the foremen. After the hearing, the foreman's position was clarified
to some extent, when the National Labor Relations Board ruled
in the Soss Manufacturing Company case (May 8, 1944) that
while a supervisory group could not be certified as a unit appro-
priate for collective bargaining, the foremen did have the right,
under the National Labor Relations Act, of protection from unfair
labor practices.^
Packard Foreman Unit Upheld
Soon after the Soss Manufacturing case, the NLRB reversed
itself again. The Board maintained that since unionization of fore-
men was no longer a "future possibility" but an "existing fact,"
the foremen in the Packard Afotor Car Company constituted a
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unit appropriate for collective bargaining. ^° To deny the group the
protection of the Act, the majority declared, would simply invite
a greater amount of industrial strife. Furthermore, the majority
recognized the need for rigid controls in modern corporate indus-
try and stated that foremen must follow the policies of higher
management. Unlike the earlier decisions in the Union Collieries
Company, and the Godchaux Sugars Company cases, this ruling
placed four classes of foremen in one bargaining unit, although
they exercised a degree of supervision over one another. The ma-
jority recognized that a common bond of sympathy may exist
between supervisors and supervised, but they asserted that sym-
pathy strikes and refusals to cross picket lines were not proof that
the supervisor's union was dependent upon the rank-and-file labor
movement.
In his dissent. Member Reilly related that the Packard decision
would cause great damage to the relationship between manage-
ment's minor supervisors and the workers. He believed that a fore-
man's union could function only in harmony with the workers'
union.
The significance of the Packard decision is twofold:
(1) the Maryland Drydock case was reversed and foremen who
were members of an independent supervisor's union were
granted the right of certification under the National Labor
Relations Act; and (2) the decision broadened the scope of a
foreman unit appropriate for collective bargaining. In the Union
Collieries and subsequent decisions, for example, the Board had
refused to recognize collective bargaining units that included men
of various supervisory levels. In the Packard case, the Board
recognized four levels of supervision as one unit appropriate for
collective bargaining.
The Board may have been influenced by the fact that the Ford
Motor Company had accepted six classes of supervisors in its con-
tract with the Foreman's Association of America. In fact, the Board
majority mentioned that the Ford Company unit of six levels of
supervision was broader than the unit proposed in the present case.
The Packard company refused to recognize the newly certified
foreman's group and the Foreman's Association formally charged
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the company with an unfair lahor practice. After the second presen-
tation of the" case to the NLRB, Paul Herzog, the new chairman,
wrote the majority opinion which upheld the previous Packard
decision. Mr. Herzog stated that the concern of the Board was
not to decide whether or not foremen should join unions, hut rather
to determine how the Act may he made availahle to organized
foremen as it is to unionized production workers. Despite this
ruling, the company refused to follow the directive of the Board,
in order to obtain a court review of the case.
In the L. A. Young Spring and Wire Corporation decision, the
Board made clear that a group of supervisors need not have only
limited supervisory powders in order to be certified as a unit appro-
priate for collective bargaining. ^^ Such a decision indicated that the
Board would recognize higher levels of supervision so long as they
were appropriately grouped according to duties and responsibilities.
Rank-and-File Affiliation Approved
In the Packard case, the union involved had been the Foreman's
Association of America, an independent foreman's union. When the
NLRB ruled on the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company case, how-
ever, it was confronted with the United Clerical, Technical and
Supervisory Employees Union which was affiliated with the United
Mine Workers of America, a rank-and-file labor union. ^^ The
decision granted this union right of collective bargaining under the
protection of the National Labor Relations Act.
In the majority opinion, the Board members maintained that
the Board had no right to refuse to recognize a freely chosen labor
organization which was not company dominated. The Board, they
declared, must concern itself with the problems of grouping em-
ployees. To select the representatives or to say a group should have
no representation seemed to them to be outside the jurisdiction of
the Board.
Member Reilly, voicing his opinion in a dissent, charged that the
objectives of the National Labor Relations Board were so distorted
as a result of the Jones and Laughlin decision that legislative or
judicial correction was essential. With broader unionization and a
closer alliance with the rank and file, Member Reillv belie\ed that
b
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the doctrine developed in the last decade to insure the freedom of
the workers had been repLidiated and that managerial ability to
operate the mines efficiently had been "seriously impaired." With-
out doubt, the Jones and Laughlin decision increased the scope of
foreman organization. The decision gave the "green light" to fore-
men who wished to affiliate with a rank-and-file union.
As a result of the Packard and subsequent decisions, super-
visors, as employees, received legal protection in their right to
collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act.
Some of the controversial legal issues that were settled include:
(1) various levels of supervision having simi-
lar powers but a moderate degree of supervision
over one another might bargain as one unit;
(2) the extent of duties and responsibilities of
foremen were important to NLRB only in so far
as they aid the determination of the appropriate
bargaining unit;
(3) the type of industry was unimportant in
determining whether a unit of supervisory em-
ployees was appropriate for collective bargaining;
(4) foremen might be represented by an inde-
pendent supervisors' union or by a rank-and-file
labor union ; and
(5) employers might still be cited for an unfair
labor practice should the supervisors, upon the
authorization of the company, attempt to dom-
inate production employees.
The Board had not, however, given a clear ruling on the appro-
priateness of a unit of production employees represented by a fore-
man's union or of a unit whose membership consisted of both
production and supervisory employees.
Courts Uphold Packard Ruling
Officials of the Packard Motor Car Company indicated that
they desired a court review of the NLRB decision giving the
supervisory employees the protection of the National Labor Rela-
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tions Act. When the company was cited for an unfair labor prac-
tice in December, 1945, because of refusal to recoj^nize the fore-
men's collective-bargaining unit, the Board members said they
agreed with the company on "the importance of judicial review"
and that they would cooperate with the company in an effort to
speed final adjudication.
On August 12, 1946, the Sixth United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, in a two-to-one decision, upheld the NLRB order that the
Packard Alotor Car Companv bargain collectively with its super-
visory employees. The United States Supreme Court, on March 10,
1947, in upholding the decision of the lower court, declared that
foremen w-ere employees and that the context of the Act left no
room in which they might deny the organizational privilege to
employees, just because in some cases these employees may act in
the interest of an employer.
The judges of the Sixth Circuit Court made clear in their
opinion that the decision concerned only supervisors who w-ere
members of an unafifiliated union of supervisors and that it did not
consider the legality under the National Labor Relations Act of a
union afifiliated with a production workers' union. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, apparently rendered an even broader
decision than the appellate court in the Packard case. The decision
recognized that an individual who acted in the interest of the
employer still had interests of his own as an employee. In this case,
the majority of the High Court maintained that Congress, not the
Court, created exceptions to the Act.
A decision on the appropriateness of a unit afTiliated with a
rank-and-file union for collective bargaining purposes has not been
made by the U. S. Supreme Court. The U. S. Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia, however, upheld the government's
right to recognize a supervisors' union affiliated with a rank-and-file
union as an exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors, limited to
the period of the government's possession of the mines. ^^ The
decision w^as based upon the ability of the government to effect
changes in w-ages and conditions of employment under the War
Labor Disputes Act. This case was apparently ended by a denial
of a writ of certiorari May 19, 1947, by the Supreme Court. ^*
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Because of recent labor legislation, the Supreme Court probably will
not rule on the appropriateness of the affiliated union for collective
bargaining purposes in the Jones and Laughlin Case.
Congress Acts on Foreman Unions
Since the Supreme Court has generally upheld the decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board, employers opposed to the
organization of foremen tried to prevent supervisors' unions by
legislative measures. Numerous requests were made to Congress
that a law be passed in which the supervisory employee would be
removed from the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act.
A bill, introduced in the 79th Congress and popularly known
as the Case Bill, contained a clause which would have denied the
foremen the protective features of the National Labor Relations
Act. After passing both Houses of Congress, however, it was
vetoed by President Truman in June, 1946.
The 80th Congress in June, 1947, passed the Taft-Hartley bill
which excluded supervisors (foremen) from protection of the
National Labor Relations Act. Although President Truman vetoed
the measure. Congress overrode the veto to make the bill a law,
titled formally, Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. "Any
individual employed as a supervisor" is specifically excluded from
the definition of employees to be covered by the Act.^^
The term "supervisor" has been given a very broad definition
by the new measure. It includes "any individual having authority,
in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other em-
ployees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment."'*^
This amendment does not prohibit a supervisor from joining
a union, either a rank-and-file union or one only for foremen. But
the employer is not compelled "to deem individuals defined herein as
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY FOREMEN 21
supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either na-
tional or local, relating to collective bargaining."^'
The employer may now interfere with the union activity of his
foremen and may refuse to recognize the representatives selected
])\ the majority of these supervisors, without legally committing
an unfair labor practice. The law in effect puts the foremen in the
same position they were in after the Maryland Drydock case which
refused recognition to them. If the foremen in a plant desire
recognition by the employer for collective bargaining purposes and
are refused, they must now disestablish their union or resort to
their own economic power to secure such recognition.
Just prior to the passage of the new labor law, the Ford Motor
Company cancelled its contract with the Foreman's Association of
America. Ford spokesmen stated that the action had been taken
because they believed that the union was undermining the foreman's
sense of responsibility to the company. Union officials also can-
celled the contract in order to call a strike as a means of obtaining
demaixls for which they had been negotiating for about five months.
After a 47-day strike, the foremen returned to their jobs without a
contract and with no concessions gained.
With the expiration of the provisions of the War Labor Dis-
putes Act on June 30, 1947, the bituminous coal mines which had
been operated by the Federal Coal Mines Administration (under
terms of the Krug-Lewis Agreement of May 29, 1946) were re-
turned to private hands. The new bituminous coal agreement
reached by the United Mine Workers of America and the northern
operators, which provided substantial economic concessions for the
union, specifically exempted from the coverage of the agreement:
mine foremen, assistant mine foremen, coal inspectors and weigh
bosses at mines where men are paid by the ton, clerks, engineering
and technical forces of the operator working at or from a district
or local mine office. In addition the union agreed "not to seek to
organize or ask recognition for such excepted supervisory em-
ployees during the life of this contract." The termination date of
the agreement is June 30, 1948.
As a result of this agreement, the UMW severed from itself the
organization which had been known as the United Clerical, ^1 ech-
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nical and Supervisory Employees branch of District 50. This
organization has been succeeded by an independent organization
called the United Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Association
of America. Whether it will be able to maintain the organization
built up under the UMW is a question that cannot be answered at
this time.
Industrial Effects of Foreman Unionism
Company executives, in their endeavor to rid themselves of fore-
men's unions, have said that the foreman is management at the
"grass roots" level and that he cannot be affiliated with a union and
at the same time retain his status in the managerial hierarchy. These
spokesmen believe that the supervisor cannot be loyal both to man-
agement and to the union. Should the foremen be unionized, man-
agement asserts, the unions will be sitting on both sides of the
collective bargaining table, and this situation in turn will give an
unfair advantage to American unionism, and produce inefficiency
in production.
Many foremen maintain that as a result of the changes in
industry during the past several decades, they are a part of neither
management nor labor. Instead, they argue that they form a distinct
group in industrial relations, a group that executes the company
policy which has been formulated by higher management.
Production Efficiency
Some industrialists fear that the additional negotiations re-
quired by unionization of foremen would greatly increase the drains
on the managerial time and efficiency. They believe that such nego-
tiations would tend to increase strikes and company costs. Some
have contended that foremen's unions would effect a loss of dis-
cipline and efficiency among production workers. For instance,
C. E. Wilson, President of General Motors Corporation, stated that
the unionization of foremen "would take another 10, 15, or 20 per
cent out of the (production) activity."
FAA foremen, on the other hand, have maintained that their
organization has promoted a more harmonious relationship among
the supervisors. W. Allen Nelson of the Ford chapter of FAA
asserted that production at the Ford Motor Company increased 20
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per cent during the first year the foremen were organized. He made
no attempt to credit the entire gain to the Association; Mr. Nelson
said that industrial relations noticeably improved during that year.
Seniority
Industrial leadership has depended principally upon the promo-
tion of capable men from the minor supervisory levels. Company
officials declare that such competent men must be promoted re-
gardless of the fact that other men may have been employees of
the company for a longer period of time. The organized foremen,
however, claim the right to protest a promotion if their union
believes that a man equally capable and with more seniority should
have received the position filled.
The proper balance between complete freedom for possible merit
advancement and restrictions for the maintenance of job security is
difficult to determine. For the improvement of our productive
forces, ample opportunity for job advancement must be given in
order to attract the best-equipped individuals to mass production
industries. On the other hand, job security cannot be ignored. As
the productive forces have become more complex, workers have
demanded greater protection against any form of discriminatory
discharge. This is a problem that must be solved by the combined
groups concerned with industrial relations. So long as unions fear
discriminatory promotions and discharges, disputes concerning sen-
iority and other issues will arise.
Abolition of Foreman Level
Some industrial executives believe that the managerial problems
created by the unionization of foremen can be solved only by the
abolition of the foreman level of supervision. C. E. Wilson, for
example, has said that he would replace the unionized foreman
with a group of specialists such as cost analysts, labor-relations
experts and technologists. Modern industry has so developed that
centralized control over departmental policies is no doubt neces-
sary. Such statements, however, tend to evade the issue. Whereas
the foreman may have lost his personal association and participa-
tion in policy-making with higher management, his functions in
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executing company policy have increased. No matter what title is
given to the men who are necessary for direct supervision of the
workers these men may still desire unionization.
The foreman's duties and responsibilities must become less
haphazard and more strictly defined. A manual to acquaint the fore-
man with general plant organization and policy should be provided.
His sphere of authority needs to be defined and not circumvented
except in a real emergency. His salary scale, hours of work, sick
leave, and vacations should be reviewed regularly and should be
compared with those of the production workers. He needs to par-
ticipate in foremen's discussion groups, and conference contacts
should be established between him and top management.
Foremen and the Rank and File
The American Federation of Labor has no established policy
on the question of membership in foremen's unions. In some unions,
foremen have retained their union membership when promoted to
a supervisory position from the rank and file, and in others workers
have had to forego union membership when promoted to a super-
visory level. Yet Lewis G. Hines, legislative representative of the
AFL, declared that "... it would be impossible for the American
Federation of Labor to charter a separate and possibly hostile union
for foremen and supervisory employees in the same plant. "^^
On the other hand, the CIO chartered a separate foreman's
union in 1939 and again in 1945 chartered the LInited Foremen of
America. Whether this new organization will function in certain
industries exclusively remains to be seen. The UAW-CIO appar-
ently has made no attempt to unionize foremen in the automobile
industry. Should an outside union such as District 50 of the UMW
or the AFL attempt to absorb the independent Foreman's Associa-
tion of America, the Automobile Workers might however try to
take over the foremen in the automobile industry.
Because of their dominance in numbers and in organizational
strength, the rank-and-file unions may be a constant threat to the
independence of a supervisors' unit even if it is unaffiliated. In fact,
the rank-and-file unions may attempt to absorb the organized fore-
men as a means of eliminating what might become a threat to their
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own jurisdiction and also to augment their own strength in dealing
with the employer. That is, the rank-and-file union may try to con-
trol the supervisors' collective bargaining unit either as a repre-
sentative of a distinct supervisory group or as the representative
of an all-inclusive unit which admits both supervisors and pro-
duction men.
Employers and union men have been aware of these possi-
bilities. Contracts of the Foreman's Association with the Ford
Motor Company and the American Stove Company specifically
stipulate that the Association will not affiliate with a labor organi-
zation. The United Automobile Workers, CIO, has given strong
indications that it would not tolerate control of the FAA by out-
side international unions. The findings of the War Labor Board
Panel on foremen's problems carefully state that the men who are
responsible for discipline, work assignments, promotions, transfers,
and rate adjustments should not be subjected to the control of the
men who are supervised. ^^
Jurisdictional Disputes
Should the AFL represent the supervisors and the CIO or Dis-
trict 50 of the UMW represent the production workers, jurisdic-
tional disputes could cause an internal warfare within the labor
movement and weaken its drive for collective action. Rivalry be-
tween the large unions would interrupt the working relationships
between the supervisors and the production men, as well as cause
innumerable conflicts with management.
Future Uncertain
The entire issue of foreman unionization is not one that will
soon be settled. Most corporation spokesmen have taken the posi-
tion that foreman organization would disrupt industrial relations.
Even the labor movement has been cautious in accepting the fore-
man as a "union man."
No law can be expected to cover this problem in an adequate
manner. The definition of a foreman, itself, is so loosely used from
plant to plant that the new law on foreman unionization may be
A^ery difficult to administer. For example, in a steel plant there may
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be a pusher, a gang leader, an assistant foreman, a foreman, and a
department foreman. Which is a supervisory employee? To make
administration even more difficult, an assistant foreman in one
plant may be called a foreman in another plant, although the duties
are similar.
Some indication of the trend to be expected in court and NLRB
decisions may be seen in two recent decisions. On September 29,
1947, the United States Court of Appeals set aside the original
ruling of the NLRB in the L. A. Young Spring and Wire case. The
Court held that the original ruling, certifying a chapter of the Fore-
men's Association of America as exclusive bargaining agent for
foremen in the plant, was correct at the time, insofar as it was
based on the National Labor Relations Act. However, passage since
that time of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, has
amended the National Labor Relations Act with respect to super-
visors. In the words of the Court, it is "now unmistakably clear . . .
that the Eightieth Congress intended to deny, and has denied, the
benefits of the act to 'supervisors'." The Court held, therefore:
"Since the statute as now amended is to be applied, we shall set
aside the order of the respondent board [NLRB], which if allowed
to stand, would operate in future in a manner contrary to the
amended statute."
The NLRB itself likewise recognized this principle in its first
decision since passage of the new Act. On September 30, 1947, the
Board dismissed a complaint of the FAA that Westinghouse
Electric Corporation of East Springfield, Massachusetts, had re-
fused to bargain with the union.
Neither punitive measures nor restrictive legislation can be ex-
pected to stop foreman unionization. Only by a thorough study of
the status and problems of minor supervisory employees in industry
and the adoption of appropriate remedial measures, can the exist-
ing situation be stabilized.
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EDITORIAL NOTE
This bulletin is based on material assembled for a master's thesis
which was accepted by the Graduate School of the University of Illi-
nois in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master
of Arts in Economics. Much of the material appeared in a more
extensive article published as Bulletin No. 65 of the University of
Illinois Bureau of Economic and Business Research under the title
Foremen's Unions: A New Development in Industrial Relations.
This briefer development of the subject attempts to cover major
points of a topic which has occasioned wide discussion. The enact-
ment of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 has to some extent
relegated to the realm of history the material covering rulings on fore-
men's unions by the National Labor Relations Board. However, that
history remains pertinent to an issue which is still very much alive.
Mr. Cabe, formerly a graduate assistant in the Institute, has ac-
cepted an appointment as instructor in economics at Purdue University.
— Phillips Bradley
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